The Westboro Baptist Church does despicable things at funerals. At the hundreds of funerals its members have protested, desperate for attention, they hold signs with messages such as "You're Going to Hell" and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers."
These messages are uncouth and unpopular and rightly so. Yet, it seemed the Church was on a roll when, in 2011, it won an 8-1 decision in the US Supreme Court called Snyder v Phelps. The Court held that the Church's offensive speech was protected and could not give rise to civil liability for a claim called intentional infliction of emotional distress (pretty much what it sounds like) when the father of a slain soldier sued because Church members picketed outside his son's funeral. The Court explained that, although some of the signs related to the Snyder family, most addressed broader topics that were ostensibly of public concern -- e.g., gays in the military.
In the Snyder case, the Church complied with all local police directives. The picketing took place on a 10 by 25 foot plot of public land, behind a fence, 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held. The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the picketers. The picketing was peaceful and not loud. Snyder successfully sued for $10.9 million in damages before his judgment was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court. "Simply put," wrote Chief Justice Roberts, "the church members had a right to be where they were."
This was in part because Maryland, where the picketing in the Snyder case took place, had no funeral picketing law at the time. Now it does, like nearly every other State. The Court noted this and held that it would not decide whether such regulations are constitutional because Maryland had no such law at the time.
So, it seemed that Westboro could insult funeral-goes to its shriveled-heart's content...?
But then, a shooter killed two movie-goers in Lafayette, Louisiana. The shooter apparently was a Westboro sympathizer.
When Louisiana Governor (and presidential candidate) Bobby Jindal heard that Westboro might come to the victims' funerals he warned: "If they come here to Louisiana, if they try to disrupt this funeral,
we're going to lock them up," Jindal said during an interview on
Sunday's Meet the Press. "We're going to arrest them. They shouldn't try
that in Louisiana. We won't abide by that here."
Jindal then issued an executive order directing authorities to "strictly enforce" Louisiana's disturbing the peace law, which prohibits any "utterance, gesture, or display designed to disrupt a funeral," and "intentionally blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in any other manner obstructing or interfering, within five hundred feet" of a funeral or funeral procession.
Curiously, Jindal's executive order was not on the Governor's website until after the funerals commenced and possibly after they were over. I was checking the Governor's website throughout the day.
Jindal's threats worked. The Westboro protestors did not show up.
This is not really new. The City of Charleston temporarily banned funeral protests within 300 feet of a funeral following the recent, tragic shootings there.
And after the recent, terrible shootings in Chattanooga, the Mayor of that town issued an order stating that any picketing, protesting or
demonstrating within 500 feet of a funeral or memorial service is
considered "offensive" under Tennessee law and is prohibited.
I can't tell if the Westboro protestors showed up in Charleston or Chattanooga.
Is this all constitutional? Probably not. But, practically, it's working ... at least it worked in Louisiana.
In Synder, the Supreme Court left the door open to legitimate time, place and manner restrictions for funeral protests. But, vague terms prohibiting "gestures" or "utterances" that would "inhibit" a funeral from 500 feet away are tough to square with the First Amendment. And is all picketing around funerals "offensive" in Chattanooga? What about the counter-protestors who often show up to shame Westboro, as they deserve to be shamed, and support the fallen. Also, it doesn't help much that the clear intent of the temporary Charleston law and Jindal's threats were unequivocal: "We're going to arrest them." That strongly suggests (as if there were any doubt) that the rules and enforcement are viewpoint-based, which is a First Amendment no-no.
But, if Westboro won't show up or fight it, then maybe this is the formula for silencing Westboro: pass a law, even a temporary one, restricting funeral protests and make it clear that the law will be enforced (with prejudice if necessary) and, adding on, keep an executive order mandating that enforcement out of public view or commentary until after it is too late to challenge it.
As much as I really don't like what the Westboro people say and do, I am not comfortable with vague laws that restrict speech coupled with threats to arrest peaceful protestors. I am also unimpressed that Governor Jindal boasts about his support for the Second Amendment (see his Twitter account), even in the face of a mass shooting, but seems to have such little regard for the (appropriately unpopular) First Amendment rights of the Westboro Church, as recognized by the Supreme Court just a few years ago.
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Friday, July 31, 2015
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
California's new vaccination law vs. freedom of religion
California Governor Jerry Brown just signed into law a new provision (SB 277) requiring all public and private schoolchildren to be vaccinated, with exceptions only for medical reasons. The law will be phased in, and it has a very small window for "personal belief" exemptions for non-run-of-the-mill vaccines, but it has no special exception for religious objections.
Nothing in the First Amendment or any other law will give parents opposed on religious grounds a way to object to the new vaccine law.
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that a generally applicable law (forbidding the use of an hallucinogenic drug) had no exception under the First Amendment where Native Americans wanted to use the drug for religious reasons. The Court specifically noted that the "First Amendment's protection of religious liberty" does not require exemptions from "civic obligations" such as "compulsory vaccination laws."
The decision follows another from 1905, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, where the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory vaccination law, making an analogy to conscription laws where men could be called into the armed forces even over their "religious or political convictions."
And, in 1944, the Supreme Court held in Prince v. Massachusetts that a parent "cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child," because the "right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease."
After the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, Congress passed a law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (also known as RFRA), which gives some room to object to general federal laws for religious reasons. This will not impact California's new vaccination law because the federal RFRA does not apply to the States, and, unlike other States, California has no state version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
California's courts also would be very unlikely to read a religious exception into the vaccination law, especially since the Legislature opted not to include one. In fact, the new law would actually repeal the existing law that allows for an exemption to immunizations based on personal beliefs.
And California's courts repeatedly have cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Jacobson and Prince for the proposition that compulsory vaccinations of children do not infringe on religious liberty interests.
California is now the 32nd state to eliminate a general personal belief exemption and the third (along with Mississippi and West Virginia) to eliminate a religious exemption.
So, any noise about challenging California's new vaccination law on religious grounds is just that -- noise. Get ready for the needles.
Nothing in the First Amendment or any other law will give parents opposed on religious grounds a way to object to the new vaccine law.
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that a generally applicable law (forbidding the use of an hallucinogenic drug) had no exception under the First Amendment where Native Americans wanted to use the drug for religious reasons. The Court specifically noted that the "First Amendment's protection of religious liberty" does not require exemptions from "civic obligations" such as "compulsory vaccination laws."
The decision follows another from 1905, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, where the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory vaccination law, making an analogy to conscription laws where men could be called into the armed forces even over their "religious or political convictions."
And, in 1944, the Supreme Court held in Prince v. Massachusetts that a parent "cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child," because the "right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease."
After the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, Congress passed a law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (also known as RFRA), which gives some room to object to general federal laws for religious reasons. This will not impact California's new vaccination law because the federal RFRA does not apply to the States, and, unlike other States, California has no state version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
California's courts also would be very unlikely to read a religious exception into the vaccination law, especially since the Legislature opted not to include one. In fact, the new law would actually repeal the existing law that allows for an exemption to immunizations based on personal beliefs.
And California's courts repeatedly have cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Jacobson and Prince for the proposition that compulsory vaccinations of children do not infringe on religious liberty interests.
California is now the 32nd state to eliminate a general personal belief exemption and the third (along with Mississippi and West Virginia) to eliminate a religious exemption.
So, any noise about challenging California's new vaccination law on religious grounds is just that -- noise. Get ready for the needles.
Monday, June 29, 2015
The First Amendment and the Gay Marriage Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, recognizing marriage equality for same-sex couples, is an enormously important milestone on the road to full equality for the LGBTQ community. Its detractors vow to resist the ruling, claiming in particular that vendors should be able to refuse to provide food, flowers, etc. at gay weddings, and that protesting officiants should be able to opt out of performing such marriages.
These challenges find little, if any, support in the First Amendment. Forcing a rabbi or priest or other member of the cloth who opposes gay marriage for religious reasons to conduct a same-sex wedding would directly intrude on religion. But, having a disagreeable county clerk officiate such a wedding would not violate the First Amendment.
The continuing battle will be whether religion can serve as a justification for discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity under laws other than the First Amendment. It cannot and should not, but there is more legal work to be done.
The First Amendment Is No Defense To A General Law
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause states that Congress (or, by extension, local and state governments) shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Free Exercise Clause does not, however, exempt people from following neutral laws of general applicability. That means: laws meant to apply to everyone do not give anyone a free pass simply because religion is invoked.
The rule comes from Employment Division v. Smith, a case where the Supreme Court held that Native Americans could not use peyote (a Schedule I controlled substance -- i.e., an illegal drug), even for religious rituals, and also claim unemployment benefits. The Court ruled that, because no one was supposed to use peyote, and the individuals at issue were legitimately discharged from their jobs for using peyote (for religious reasons), the State could fairly deny them unemployment compensation. Who wrote the decision for the Court in that landmark case? Justice Scalia.
Following the logic in Justice Scalia's opinion, jurisdictions that disallow discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity (including in federal government contracting) cannot rely on the First Amendment's religious freedom guarantee as a defense to a discrimination claim. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently held, over First Amendment objections, that a photographer could not refuse to photograph a gay wedding because that State has a public accommodation law, a neutral law of general applicability, that forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation.
But not all jurisdictions in America bar discrimination based on sexual orientation. Yesterday, the Los Angeles Times told the story of Katrina Martir, a teacher in Kentucky who was fired for revealing that she is lesbian, with no legal recourse because neither her county nor her State barred such discrimination. In such unfortunate cases, the party discriminating needs no First Amendment "defense" because the law did not forbid the discrimination in the first instance.
Now, however, under Obergefell, it is not legal for the government to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples anywhere in the U.S. Thus, a pastor or other religious figure (i.e., not a government agent) could legitimately raise deeply-held religious objections to performing a gay wedding. But, a county clerk or magistrate judge no longer has a such an argument.
Ken Paxton, the Attorney General of Texas defiantly vowed to resist Obergefell by telling government employees in Texas that they have a First Amendment right not to officiate same-sex marriages. The Attorney General's edict fundamentally misunderstands the law. Government employees who officiate marriage ceremonies are not members of the clergy nor are they random citizens entitled to exercise their religious rights. They are on the job. Their job includes following the law, and it is disgraceful for the highest-ranking law enforcement official in their state to instruct them otherwise. A county clerk who officiates marriages is acting as the face of the government, not a religion and not their own personal perspective. The First Amendment does not permit the government to refuse marriage licenses based on religion. That would squarely violate another clause in the First Amendment, which forbids the establishment of religion.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, Congress (apparently very concerned about Native Americans' right to use peyote for religious reasons) passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, giving a statutory right to invoke religious freedom in response to otherwise generally applicable federal laws. RFRA -- not the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment -- has later been used as a justification for allowing people, and even corporations, to avoid laws of general applicability.
The most recent, famous application of RFRA was in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, when the Supreme Court, in a decision side-stepping the First Amendment, ruled that a closely-held (family owned) corporation with religious objections did not need to provide employees with insurance coverage to obtain contraceptive drugs despite Obamacare regulations.
In the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision, the Court addressed an important issue: would RFRA allow businesses to invoke religion to discriminate based on race? Of course not, the Court wrote, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justice Scalia (author of Employment Division v. Smith) and Justice Kennedy (author of Obergefell v. Hodges): "Our decision today provides no such shield [against racial discrimination]. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal." This rule barring racial discrimination, even for religious reasons, follows on decades of cases and laws ensuring that people of all races are permitted to participate in society equally.
As sweeping and monumental as the Obergefell decision is, it does not clearly resolve a lingering issue about whether the government has a compelling interest in stopping sexual orientation discrimination the way it does with racial discrimination.
But, it is quite clear from Obergefell, that, in the context of weddings at least, same-sex couples have equal rights to opposite-sex couples to government recognition, and that the First Amendment cannot be used as a justification to treat same-sex couples differently. The Court explained that laws and other government actions banning same-sex marriage "abridge central precepts of equality" and are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Apparently the Texas Attorney General missed that page in the opinion.
The Obergefell decision expressly acknowledges -- as it must -- that the First Amendment still protects vocal opposition to gay marriage; "The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex." The decision also acknowledges that one of the bases for recognizing marriage as a fundamental right comes from the right of association, which is grounded in the First Amendment.
These challenges find little, if any, support in the First Amendment. Forcing a rabbi or priest or other member of the cloth who opposes gay marriage for religious reasons to conduct a same-sex wedding would directly intrude on religion. But, having a disagreeable county clerk officiate such a wedding would not violate the First Amendment.
The continuing battle will be whether religion can serve as a justification for discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity under laws other than the First Amendment. It cannot and should not, but there is more legal work to be done.
The First Amendment Is No Defense To A General Law
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause states that Congress (or, by extension, local and state governments) shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Free Exercise Clause does not, however, exempt people from following neutral laws of general applicability. That means: laws meant to apply to everyone do not give anyone a free pass simply because religion is invoked.
The rule comes from Employment Division v. Smith, a case where the Supreme Court held that Native Americans could not use peyote (a Schedule I controlled substance -- i.e., an illegal drug), even for religious rituals, and also claim unemployment benefits. The Court ruled that, because no one was supposed to use peyote, and the individuals at issue were legitimately discharged from their jobs for using peyote (for religious reasons), the State could fairly deny them unemployment compensation. Who wrote the decision for the Court in that landmark case? Justice Scalia.
Following the logic in Justice Scalia's opinion, jurisdictions that disallow discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity (including in federal government contracting) cannot rely on the First Amendment's religious freedom guarantee as a defense to a discrimination claim. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently held, over First Amendment objections, that a photographer could not refuse to photograph a gay wedding because that State has a public accommodation law, a neutral law of general applicability, that forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation.
But not all jurisdictions in America bar discrimination based on sexual orientation. Yesterday, the Los Angeles Times told the story of Katrina Martir, a teacher in Kentucky who was fired for revealing that she is lesbian, with no legal recourse because neither her county nor her State barred such discrimination. In such unfortunate cases, the party discriminating needs no First Amendment "defense" because the law did not forbid the discrimination in the first instance.
Now, however, under Obergefell, it is not legal for the government to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples anywhere in the U.S. Thus, a pastor or other religious figure (i.e., not a government agent) could legitimately raise deeply-held religious objections to performing a gay wedding. But, a county clerk or magistrate judge no longer has a such an argument.
Ken Paxton, the Attorney General of Texas defiantly vowed to resist Obergefell by telling government employees in Texas that they have a First Amendment right not to officiate same-sex marriages. The Attorney General's edict fundamentally misunderstands the law. Government employees who officiate marriage ceremonies are not members of the clergy nor are they random citizens entitled to exercise their religious rights. They are on the job. Their job includes following the law, and it is disgraceful for the highest-ranking law enforcement official in their state to instruct them otherwise. A county clerk who officiates marriages is acting as the face of the government, not a religion and not their own personal perspective. The First Amendment does not permit the government to refuse marriage licenses based on religion. That would squarely violate another clause in the First Amendment, which forbids the establishment of religion.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, Congress (apparently very concerned about Native Americans' right to use peyote for religious reasons) passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, giving a statutory right to invoke religious freedom in response to otherwise generally applicable federal laws. RFRA -- not the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment -- has later been used as a justification for allowing people, and even corporations, to avoid laws of general applicability.
The most recent, famous application of RFRA was in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, when the Supreme Court, in a decision side-stepping the First Amendment, ruled that a closely-held (family owned) corporation with religious objections did not need to provide employees with insurance coverage to obtain contraceptive drugs despite Obamacare regulations.
In the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision, the Court addressed an important issue: would RFRA allow businesses to invoke religion to discriminate based on race? Of course not, the Court wrote, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justice Scalia (author of Employment Division v. Smith) and Justice Kennedy (author of Obergefell v. Hodges): "Our decision today provides no such shield [against racial discrimination]. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal." This rule barring racial discrimination, even for religious reasons, follows on decades of cases and laws ensuring that people of all races are permitted to participate in society equally.
As sweeping and monumental as the Obergefell decision is, it does not clearly resolve a lingering issue about whether the government has a compelling interest in stopping sexual orientation discrimination the way it does with racial discrimination.
But, it is quite clear from Obergefell, that, in the context of weddings at least, same-sex couples have equal rights to opposite-sex couples to government recognition, and that the First Amendment cannot be used as a justification to treat same-sex couples differently. The Court explained that laws and other government actions banning same-sex marriage "abridge central precepts of equality" and are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Apparently the Texas Attorney General missed that page in the opinion.
The Obergefell decision expressly acknowledges -- as it must -- that the First Amendment still protects vocal opposition to gay marriage; "The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex." The decision also acknowledges that one of the bases for recognizing marriage as a fundamental right comes from the right of association, which is grounded in the First Amendment.
"It's certainly going to be an issue"
During oral argument in the Obergefell case, Justice Alito noted that a religious school lost its tax exempt status for opposing interracial marriage and asked if the same thing could happen to a religious school that opposed same-sex marriage. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli (who was arguing in favor of gay marriage for the federal government) candidly responded: "... It's certainly going to be an issue." It is an issue because of the inconsistency in the law, nationwide, in disallowing discrimination based on sexual orientation. As I noted, many states do not outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation, and many states have their own versions of RFRA.
The So-Called "First Amendment Defense Act"
One week before the Court issued its decision in Obergefell, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) and Representative Paul Labrador (R-ID) introduced the "First Amendment Defense Act." The law is meant to stop "discrimination" against people who believe (or act on their belief, whether religious or "moral") that marriage is limited to one man and one woman. In other words, the law basically says: "Don't discriminate against people who discriminate." The proposed law would be unconstitutional.
First, this proposed law assumes that the First Amendment itself is no defense. If this is really what the First Amendment meant, we wouldn't need a new law to "defend" it because the First Amendment is part of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land.
Second, this proposed law would enshrine and essentially endorse discrimination against same-sex couples, contrary to the holding in Obergefell. Imagine if it read: the federal government will not deny taxpayer-funded government contracts or grants to anyone who, for religious or other "moral" reasons, acts on their opposition to interracial marriage. Wrong. Bad. Now, replace the word "interracial" with "same-sex". The proposed law simply cannot be squared with what the Court just held in Obergefell -- that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution protects "personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs." A contrary system would consign same-sex couples "to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable in their own lives."
What if a person who believes firmly in supporting gay marriage for religious or moral reasons refuses to help fund a government contract or grant award to a person who disagrees with gay marriage? Under the proposed law, there would be no support in the law for the pro-gay marriage religious or moral conviction. Such a viewpoint-based law, like all viewpoint-based laws, would be presumptively unconstitutional, and could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. Ironic, isn't it? The "First Amendment Defense Act" would violate the First Amendment.
Final Thoughts
Obergefell was decided correctly. I look forward to the day when the law will not countenance discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in any context. We are not there yet.
As strongly as I believe in full equality, I do have a problem with forcing members of the clergy to perform marriage ceremonies antithetical to their strongly-held beliefs. That is a line I think is fairly drawn in favor of religion -- no matter how unfortunate I perceive those religious views to be. I have no problem, however, with telling county clerks -- who are the face of the governments that employ them -- to perform gay marriages even if their religious beliefs (or their moronic Attorneys General) dictate otherwise.
In order to fully realize the equal dignity recognized in Obergefell, we need more laws making clear that discrimination against those who are LGBTQ has no place in our society or under our Constitution.
During oral argument in the Obergefell case, Justice Alito noted that a religious school lost its tax exempt status for opposing interracial marriage and asked if the same thing could happen to a religious school that opposed same-sex marriage. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli (who was arguing in favor of gay marriage for the federal government) candidly responded: "... It's certainly going to be an issue." It is an issue because of the inconsistency in the law, nationwide, in disallowing discrimination based on sexual orientation. As I noted, many states do not outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation, and many states have their own versions of RFRA.
The So-Called "First Amendment Defense Act"
One week before the Court issued its decision in Obergefell, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) and Representative Paul Labrador (R-ID) introduced the "First Amendment Defense Act." The law is meant to stop "discrimination" against people who believe (or act on their belief, whether religious or "moral") that marriage is limited to one man and one woman. In other words, the law basically says: "Don't discriminate against people who discriminate." The proposed law would be unconstitutional.
First, this proposed law assumes that the First Amendment itself is no defense. If this is really what the First Amendment meant, we wouldn't need a new law to "defend" it because the First Amendment is part of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land.
Second, this proposed law would enshrine and essentially endorse discrimination against same-sex couples, contrary to the holding in Obergefell. Imagine if it read: the federal government will not deny taxpayer-funded government contracts or grants to anyone who, for religious or other "moral" reasons, acts on their opposition to interracial marriage. Wrong. Bad. Now, replace the word "interracial" with "same-sex". The proposed law simply cannot be squared with what the Court just held in Obergefell -- that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution protects "personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs." A contrary system would consign same-sex couples "to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable in their own lives."
What if a person who believes firmly in supporting gay marriage for religious or moral reasons refuses to help fund a government contract or grant award to a person who disagrees with gay marriage? Under the proposed law, there would be no support in the law for the pro-gay marriage religious or moral conviction. Such a viewpoint-based law, like all viewpoint-based laws, would be presumptively unconstitutional, and could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. Ironic, isn't it? The "First Amendment Defense Act" would violate the First Amendment.
Final Thoughts
Obergefell was decided correctly. I look forward to the day when the law will not countenance discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in any context. We are not there yet.
As strongly as I believe in full equality, I do have a problem with forcing members of the clergy to perform marriage ceremonies antithetical to their strongly-held beliefs. That is a line I think is fairly drawn in favor of religion -- no matter how unfortunate I perceive those religious views to be. I have no problem, however, with telling county clerks -- who are the face of the governments that employ them -- to perform gay marriages even if their religious beliefs (or their moronic Attorneys General) dictate otherwise.
In order to fully realize the equal dignity recognized in Obergefell, we need more laws making clear that discrimination against those who are LGBTQ has no place in our society or under our Constitution.
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